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Abstract
We analyze the economic effects of the differentiated targets for carbon
abatement in six European Union member states.  Our recursively-dynamic model
includes a detailed representation of trade and energy consumption and incorporates
optimistic projections for future energy markets provided by the European Commission
as the Business-as-Usual scenario.  In the base case we find that the EU
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol implies low overall costs and a relatively even
cost distribution across member states.  We also show that a less optimistic
development in energy efficiency implies higher costs in all countries, especially in
those with high abatement costs.  Finally, we find that uniform abatement targets
increase overall costs marginally but changes the cost distribution significantly,
holding total EU emissions constant.  
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 Article 3 in United Nations [1997].  The group of Annex I countries consists of developed economies plus
economies in transition, listed in Annex I of United Nations [1992].
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1. Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol documents what many believed to be impossible: negotiators for
many of the world’s countries agreed on emissions targets for the early part of the 21st
century.  The protocol commits the Annex I countries to reduce their aggregate CO2
equivalent emissions by at least 5 percent below 1990 levels in the period 2008 to 2012.1  The
agreement reflects wide differences in the willingness to accept emissions constraints:
developing countries refused any commitment while the European Union (EU) at the other
end agreed to an 8% overall reduction. The burden sharing negotiations subsequently
continued at the EU level when the member states distributed the EU constraint internally.
Table 1 shows that the country-specific targets within the EU bubble range from a 28%
reduction for Luxembourg to a 27% increase for Portugal.
Does the EU bubble imply a “fair” distribution of the burden across EU member
states?  Economic analysis may inform this debate by translating the emissions constraints
into estimates for welfare costs.  The cost estimate for a given country will obviously depend
on its current economic structure, such as the efficiency of the installed energy consuming
technologies, the fuel mix, and trade relations with other countries.   Differences in the
starting point for each country may imply that the same proportional cutback results in high
costs in one country and low costs in another.
The expected distribution of costs also depends on differences in the future economic
development across countries.  That is, the cost estimates will depend on Business-as-Usual
(BaU) projections for GDP, populations, energy efficiency improvements, fuel prices, etc. 
High economic growth, for example, leads by itself to high energy demands and emissions. 
2This would increase the effective abatement requirement as the Kyoto targets refer to 1990
emissions levels and higher economic growth will therefore imply higher total abatement
costs.
We analyze the agreement on differentiated CO2 abatement within the EU using the
Conventional Wisdom (CW) scenario in European Commission [1996] as the BaU
projection.  We estimate both the total costs and the distribution of costs across EU member
states and evaluate the main assumptions in the BaU projections.  Specifically, we focus on
the assumptions about non-uniform efficiency improvements and fuel shifting embodied in
the CW baseline.  Finally, we analyze the consequences of uniform abatement targets across
the EU for total costs and the distribution of these costs.  
The literature has surprisingly little to say about these issues.  Most modelers are
typically careful in specifying their BaU assumptions but they rarely report results from
sensitivity analyses.  
A couple of articles have reported results from the GEM-E3 model of analyses of
carbon abatement in 11 EU member states. Conrad and Schmidt [1998a] find that a 10%
reduction in CO2 emissions from the EU implies an overall welfare loss of around 0.24% of
GDP when each country has to reduce emissions by 10%.  Country-specific welfare effects
range from a 0.06% gain in Portugal to a 0.55% loss in Denmark.  Permit prices for CO2
range from US$10 per ton in Greece to US$47 in Denmark (assuming that ECU1 = US$1).  If
emissions can be traded between countries, they estimate the permit price to US$23 and the
overall welfare loss decreases slightly to 0.21%.  In a similar analysis, Conrad and Schmidt
[1998b] find a double dividend, i.e., 10% lower carbon emissions and positive gross welfare
effects from the policy, when they recycle permit revenues via a distortionary labor income
2
 See Capros et al. [1998] for more results from the GEM-E3 model.
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 The model includes three Northern EU countries (Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom) and three
Southern EU countries (France, Italy, and Spain).
4
 We recycle carbon tax revenues via lump-sum transfers to the representative agents in the model.  Also, we
assume that emissions cannot be traded across countries.
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tax.2
Unfortunately, several important differences in model characteristics make it hard to
compare the results with the present analysis.  First, and most important, none of the articles
based on the GEM-E3 model include BaU projections for GDP, CO2 emissions, energy
prices, etc.  Second, the GEM-E3 model includes both a labor-leisure choice and involuntary
employment whereas we have a fixed labor supply.  Finally, it assumes endogenous balances
of trade and exogenous exchange rates.  We assume that the balances of trade do not change
and let the exchange rates clear the foreign exchange markets.
The present analysis makes three sets of contributions.  First, to develop an explicit
dynamic model, we extend an existing static, multi-sector model of six EU member states to
incorporate representative agents with myopic expectations.3  Second, we develop a
calibration method that allows us to use the CW scenario as our baseline equilibrium. 
Finally, we use this recursively-dynamic model to analyze the EU agreement on differentiated
CO2 abatement.
The following results emerge from our simulations.  First, total costs in 2010 for the
EU amount to a 0.4% consumption loss and a range of costs for the member states between
zero and a loss of 0.7%.  CO2 tax rates vary from $22 per ton CO2 in Spain to $99 in Italy.4
Second, the CW baseline embodies significant fuel shifting in electricity production in
all countries and high efficiency gains in the Northern European countries.  These
assumptions imply large decreases in CO2 intensity and therefore low effective abatement
requirements compared with our alternative baseline of uniform growth in energy efficiency
5
 The EU targets for the six countries amount to an average emissions cutback of 11%.
6
 The six selected countries also emit roughly 80% of EU emissions in 2010 in the projections reported below.
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of 1% per annum.  With the latter baseline, total costs double and the range of costs changes
from a low of 0.1% in Spain to a high of 2.2% in Denmark.  The uniform baseline lowers the
overall level of energy efficiency gains, and CO2 tax rates therefore increase in all countries.
The North experiences the largest decreases in energy efficiency and therefore also the largest
increases in CO2 tax rates.
Finally, we find that uniform abatement targets within the EU have a small impact on
total costs, holding total EU abatement constant.  The distribution of costs changes, however. 
Spain and France would suffer large economic losses as their abatement targets change from
+15% and 0%, respectively, to -11%.5  Uniform targets increase costs for Spain and France,
while Denmark and Germany reduce their total abatement costs by around 50%.  This
scenario, although politically unrealistic, illustrates the size of the implicit transfers involved
in the burden sharing negotiations.
Section 2 discusses the CW baseline for future energy markets.  Section 3 describes
our model and the steps involved in calibrating it to the CW baseline.  Section 4 defines our
policy scenarios and Section 5 presents the results.  Section 6 offers concluding remarks.  
2. Baseline Energy Market Projections
EU member states differ significantly with respect to CO2 characteristics.  Table 2
presents summary statistics revealing the main differences.  It focuses on the six countries in
our model and shows that the selected countries jointly account for more than 80% of EU
GDP and aggregate EU CO2 emissions in 1990.6  The sector contributing most to CO2
emissions is electricity, whose fuel mix differs significantly across countries.  A large share
7
 See European Commission [1996; p.48-54] for the complete description of this scenario. 
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of nuclear-based electricity results in France having a very low CO2 intensity (ton of CO2 per
GWh), whereas large shares of coal-based electricity implies higher intensities in Denmark
and Germany.  Finally, the rich Northern European countries also have the highest emissions
per capita.
What happens to economic growth, energy prices, and CO2 emissions without climate
policy?  Cost estimates for the Kyoto commitments crucially depend on answers to this
question.  CO2 emissions are directly linked to the combustion of fossil fuels, so it follows
that baseline projections of the development of the energy system play a key role in the design
of the abatement policies.  In particular, projections for energy efficiency improvements and
the fuel mix in electricity generation are crucial for the reference level of CO2 emissions.
The CW scenario in European Commission [1996] suggests how energy markets in
Europe might evolve if current policies remain in place.7  The assumptions of the CW
scenario include smooth increases in world energy prices, no changes in current energy taxes,
limited penetration of more efficient supply technologies, and no changes in energy market
regulation.  Renewable, CO2 free, energy production increases its share in total energy supply
but fossil fuels continue to be the main source of energy.  Gas and oil consumption increase,
whereas the use of nuclear fuels and coal slowly decreases. 
Table 3 summarizes the CW baseline with respect to economic growth, the
development of CO2 emissions, and the fossil fuel mix in thermal electricity generation. 
France and the CO2 intensive Northern European countries experience the largest decreases in
the CO2 intensity.  Table 4 shows an increase of 6% in total CO2 emissions between 1990 and
2010 for the six EU countries covered by our model.  GDP increases by around 50% in the
8
 See Böhringer, Ferris, and Rutherford [1998] for an algebraic formulation of the static model, and Böhringer,
Harrison, and Rutherford [1998] for an application of the static model to carbon abatement and burden sharing
within the EU.
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same period, i.e., the CW embodies a strong decoupling of growth in GDP and CO2
emissions.  The fuel shifting described above and significant efficiency improvements
account for this result.  Section D in Table 3 focuses on the electricity sector where the
emissions intensity decreases significantly due to fuel shifting from coal to gas.
3. Analytical Framework and Baseline Calibration
This section presents the main characteristics of a recursively-dynamic multi-sector
model of the six EU countries.  We also discuss the representation of the CW scenario as our
baseline and the subsequent sensitivity analysis of the BaU assumptions.
The model is a dynamic extension of a previous static model designed to investigate
the economic implications of alternative CO2 abatement strategies for the European Union.8 
Table 5 gives an overview of the regional and sectoral dis-aggregation of the current model. 
The choice of sectors and regions captures key dimensions in the analysis of CO2 abatement
such as differences in CO2-intensity across sectors, energy goods, and bilateral trade. 
Appendix A provides an algebraic documentation of the model.
We have developed an explicitly dynamic model to incorporate the time paths for
GDP, CO2 emissions, energy prices, etc., for the CW scenario.  We assume constant, region-
specific marginal propensities to save consistent with a growth rate of 2% per year in all
countries.  The path for the economy is represented by a set of connected equilibria where the
current period's saving augments capital stocks in the next period.  Consumers allocate
income between present and future consumption subject to a fixed marginal propensity to
9
 See appendix B for details of the calibration procedure.
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save and investment adjusts passively to savings.  The intra-period model corresponds to the
previous static model.  Base year data determine the parameters of the functional forms from
a given set of quantities, prices and benchmark elasticities.
A simple calibration of the model along the time path would typically involve
calibration to a steady-state where all physical quantities (including CO2 emissions) grow at
an exogenous uniform rate while relative prices remain unchanged.  The virtue of a steady-
state baseline is that it provides a transparent reference path for the evaluation of policy
interference: any structural change in the counterfactual can be attributed to the new policy.  
In the present analysis we want to incorporate exogenous information from the CW
baseline on non-uniform growth rates in GDP, fossil fuel production, fuel mixes in electricity
generation, changes in world market energy prices and CO2 emission profiles.  The
calibration procedure involves two steps.9  First, we scale factor endowments, fuel demands
in electricity production and world market energy prices.  Second, we incorporate
autonomous energy efficiency improvements (AEEI) to match the aggregate emissions
profiles.  AEEI represents energy efficiency improvements in addition to energy demand
reductions caused by changes in energy prices.  The European Commission [1996] mentions
research or changes in public standards as sources of efficiency improvements.
After the calibration the model represents the CW baseline as an equilibrium solution. 
Figure 1 shows the CW CO2 emissions profile with an alternative BaU path labeled
LOW_AEEI.  The latter deviates from CW only with respect to the assumption about AEEI
and exogenous fuel shifting in the electricity sector.  In the LOW_AEEI baseline we solve the
model with all AEEI equal to 1% p.a. and let relative prices determine the fuel mix in the
10
 A poll of 22 experts reported in Manne and Richels [1994] results in an average AEEI value of 0.7% p.a.
11
 See EU [1998].
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electricity sector.
Table 4 shows that aggregate CO2 emissions in 2010 exceed the 1990 level by 6% in
the CW baseline and 20% in the LOW_AEEI baseline.  Two factors explain most of this
difference.  First, the CW baseline implies more fuel shifting from coal to gas in the
electricity sector than the model can explain with changes in relative prices.  Second, AEEI
exceeds 1% p.a. in many cases in the CW baseline, and in particular Germany and Denmark
are expected to experience large energy efficiency improvements.10  
We do not regard the LOW_AEEI baseline as more realistic than the CW baseline that
is based on a compilation of detailed country studies.  Rather we think of it as a sensitivity
analysis that illustrates the implications of the CW assumptions about relatively high values
for AEEI and fuel shifting in electricity generation. 
4. Scenario Definitions
Our numerical analysis distinguishes three CO2 abatement scenarios: KYOTO,
UNIFORM, and HIGH_BAU.  The KYOTO scenario implements the EU agreement on
differentiated emissions reductions that distributes the 8% Kyoto commitment by the EU
across member states.11  The KYOTO scenario, which employs the CW baseline as the BaU,
represents our base case.  
The differentiated cutbacks amount to an average reduction of 11% for the six
countries in our model.  The UNIFORM scenario requires all six countries to reduce
emissions uniformly by 11% and it also uses the CW baseline.  This scenario allows us to
analyze the implications of the differentiated cutbacks, holding total EU emissions constant.
9In the HIGH_BAU scenario we apply the differentiated cutbacks used in the KYOTO
scenario but employ different BaU assumptions: All AEEI equal 1% p.a. and relative prices
determine the fuel mix in electricity production, i.e., the LOW_AEEI baseline.
The last three columns in Table 4 show the effective abatement requirements in 2010
in the three scenarios.  As expected, the choice of baseline has a considerable impact on the
required abatement effort.
Several characteristics are common to all three scenarios.  First, all scenarios result in
the same aggregate CO2 abatement for the six EU countries in the model.  We ignore the
issue of carbon leakage and we thus assume that the EU policies do not lead to higher
emissions outside the EU.  This allows us to compare the results without considering the
benefits from CO2 abatement, i.e., we only consider the gross costs.
Second, we use the same cutback profile for aggregate EU emissions in all scenarios. 
Specifically, we assume a stabilization of aggregate emissions in the year 2000 at 1990 levels
and a linear cutback between 2000 and 2010.  In other words, all countries have to meet half
their 2010 commitments by 2005. 
Third, we do not allow for trade in emissions across countries.  Emissions can be
traded across sectors within a given country, but all emissions reductions must take place
domestically and no emissions can be purchased abroad.
Fourth, we incorporate the emissions constraints as a resource constraint in the model
where we interpret the shadow price on the constraint as the CO2 tax rate.  The representative
consumer in each region collects all the revenue and the provision of public goods stays
constant.
The model solves for counterfactual equilibria in five-year steps starting in the year
2000. We report consumption losses and CO2 tax rates in Figures 2-5.  Consumption losses
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are calculated as the percentage change in final consumption relative to the relevant baseline
and CO2 tax rates (marginal abatement costs) are reported in US$1990 per metric ton of CO2.
5. Results
The effective emissions targets provide the starting point for the interpretation of the
results (see Table 4) and we begin with our base case, the KYOTO scenario.  Figure 2 shows
that the high abatement countries Denmark, Germany, Italy, and the UK face high carbon
taxes whereas the low targets for France and Spain require relatively low tax rates.  The
stabilization of Germany’s emissions in the year 2000 does not require any carbon tax as the
unification caused a significant drop in emissions from 1990 to 1995.  
The carbon taxes cause efficiency losses and Figure 3 summarizes the results for
consumption losses in 2010.  Overall, the KYOTO scenario implies a total consumption loss
of 0.4% in 2010 and the distribution of consumption losses reflects the differences in tax rates
as explained above.  The high abatement countries Germany and Denmark also bear the
highest consumption losses while France and Spain meet their targets at very low costs.  Two
effects work in opposite directions to produce the negligible consumption loss for Spain. 
First, the low tax rate induces a small efficiency cost.  Second, Spain experiences a gain as its
production becomes more competitive compared with its EU competitors because tax rates
are much higher in the rest of the EU.
All three Southern countries (Spain, Italy and France) face higher targets in the
UNIFORM scenario compared with the KYOTO scenario, whereas the Northern countries’
emissions constraints become less binding.  This implies a significantly different pattern of
carbon taxes as shown in Figure 4.  Low efficiency gains and relatively little fuel shifting in
the CW baseline imply that the uniform targets result in relatively high effective targets in the
12
 Italy’s CW baseline emissions grow relatively slowly because of the absence of fuel shifting in the electricity
sector and low efficiency improvements.
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Southern countries.  These countries therefore experience the highest tax rates.  
Figure 3 shows that total EU costs increase marginally in the UNIFORM scenario, but
the cost distribution changes dramatically.  Compared to the KYOTO scenario, the costs for
Denmark and Germany decrease by around 50% whereas the costs increase in all Southern
countries.  Spain jumps from virtually zero costs to a 0.9% consumption loss.  While this
scenario may be politically irrelevant, it shows the implicit transfers involved in the
negotiations about the EU bubble.  Total EU emissions are identical in the KYOTO and the
UNIFORM scenarios but the distribution of emissions allowance differs.  The larger the
allowance, the lower the carbon tax rate and the smaller the efficiency cost.  
Both the KYOTO and the UNIFORM scenarios use the CW baseline.  The 
LOW_AEEI baseline in Figure 1 shows that baseline emissions exceed CW emissions by
14% of 1990 emissions when AEEI equals 1% p.a. and relative prices determine the fuel mix
in electricity production.  The last column in Table 4 shows that the EU commitment in
Kyoto now requires an effective total cutbacks of 26% compared with the LOW_AEEI
baseline.  The effective targets increase for all countries and the Northern countries
experience the highest increases.  
Figure 5 shows, as expected, that higher carbon taxes follow the more stringent targets
in the HIGH_BAU scenario.  Tax rates increase between 50 and 100% for all countries
except Italy.12  The higher rates cause higher consumption losses in all countries and increase
the range of costs from 0.1% in Spain to 2.2% in Denmark.  Put differently, if the optimistic
CW baseline fails to materialize and future European energy markets develop more
uniformly, the differentiated targets will imply a less equitable distribution of abatement
13
 The tables with results are available from the authors.
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costs.
Finally, we relax the assumption about no trade in emissions across countries. 
Specifically, we assume that all six countries can trade emissions freely such that the same
carbon tax rate applies in all countries.  The quantitative effects of this change turns out to be
small and we thus conclude that our results are robust with respect to the assumption about
emissions trading.
In our model, trade in emissions leads to equalization of the domestic carbon tax rates
and this influences the results via two channels: the distortionary effects of carbon taxes
change and the values of the emission endowments change.  Countries that previously had
carbon tax rates below the new common tax rate will experience higher distortionary costs
from higher carbon tax rates but they will also find their emission endowments more
valuable.  Conversely, countries with high carbon tax rates will have lower distortionary costs
but also lower carbon tax revenues.  Emissions trading may also change the international
incidence of carbon taxes as the burden of the taxes in a given country now get shifted
differently to foreign and domestic agents.
We use the model to trace all these effects and the main results can be summarized as
follows.13  First, some countries gain slightly, others experience small losses and the overall
EU costs decrease marginally.  That is, trading within the EU imply small total costs’ savings. 
Intuitively, the differences in carbon tax rates before we allow for trading are significant but
not large, and this effectively limits the extent of emissions trading.  Spain, a net exporter,
and Germany, a net importer, gain most from emissions trading.  Second, we also conclude
that our results regarding energy market projections are robust.  We find that the effects of
13
changing projections are similar to the no trading case, although the effects mostly are
quantitatively smaller.  Finally, uniform abatement targets continue to show large implicit
transfers from Northern European member states to Southern member states.  This result hold
although the differences in consumption losses decrease between differentiated and uniform
abatement targets.
6. Concluding Remarks
Burden sharing dominates the climate policy negotiations since the participating
countries must view the expected distribution of costs as “fair” in order for them to be
politically acceptable.  Negotiators point to both the countries’ current economic structure
and projections for the future economic development when they propose “fair” abatement
targets.  
We have analyzed the EU agreement on differentiated greenhouse gas abatement with
a particular focus on the role of baseline projections for future energy markets.  We used a
dynamic multi-sector, multi-region general equilibrium model for the EU.  The following
insights emerge from our policy simulations:
(i) The overall costs of the EU bubble following its Kyoto commitment are low when we
use the CW scenario provided by the European Commission as the baseline.  The range
of costs across member states is narrow, and the necessary CO2 taxes in the year 2010 are
below US$100 per ton CO2 in all countries.
(ii) The CW baseline implies significant fuel shifting in electricity generation and large
energy efficiency improvements by historical standards.  If the projected, strong
decoupling of GDP growth and CO2 fails to materialize, both the overall CO2 abatement
costs and the range of costs across member states may increase significantly. 
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(iii) Uniform abatement hardly increases total costs but it changes the cost distribution
between countries considerably.  We show that the EU bubble implicitly involves large
economic transfers from the Northern European member states to the Southern European
member states.  This may be consistent with a higher willingness to pay for emissions
reductions in the Northern countries.
Finally, we close with a caveat.  Our model captures important aspects of bilateral
trade and energy consumption in the EU.  It is nonetheless a crude approximation of the real
world’s technologies, preferences, factor endowments, etc., and we therefore caution against
too literal an interpretation of the numerical results.
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Appendix A
This appendix provides an algebraic summary of the equilibrium conditions for the
model.  First, we present the main assumptions of the model and introduce notation.  We then
present the algebraic model.
Nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions characterize the use of
inputs in production and all production exhibits non-increasing returns to scale.  Goods are
produced with capital, labor, energy, and materials and all sectors produce a single.  We
therefore use ‘goods’ and ‘sectors’ interchangeably.  Firms behave competitively and all
markets are perfectly competitive.
A representative agent (RA) in each region is endowed with three primary factors:
natural resources (used for fossil fuel production), labor and initial stock of capital.  Nested
CES functions characterize consumption by the RA (final demand) and the RA has myopic
expectations, i.e., he is not forward-looking.  The supplies of labor and natural resources are
exogenous and labor and capital can move freely across sectors within each region but cannot
move between regions.  Natural resources are sector specific.
All goods, except coal, crude oil and gas, are differentiated by region of origin. 
Constant elasticity of transformation functions characterize the differentiation of production
between production for the domestic markets and the export markets. Regarding imports,
nested CES functions characterize the choice between imported and domestic varieties of the
same good (Armington).
The rest of the world is represented with horizontal export demand and import supply
schedules, i.e., the EU regions behave as a small open economy.  The balance of payments for
each region with respect to the rest of the world is exogenous.
A constant marginal propensity to save characterizes the RA’s allocation of income
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between savings, i.e., investments and current consumption.  Investments begin to provide
capital services one period after installation and the capital stock depreciates at a constant
rate.  Growth augments the labor endowment at a constant rate.
Finally, lump sum transfers finance the exogenous government demands and the
government in each region transfers all carbon tax revenues to the RA in the region.
The myopic expectations imply that the economies effectively reduce to a set of
connected equilibria, where the current period’s investments augments the capital stock in the
next period.  That is, all equilibrium conditions are strictly intra-period and we can thus omit
time indices with out loss of generality.
We characterize the model with two classes of equilibrium conditions: zero profit
conditions and market clearance conditions.  The former determines activity levels and the
latter determines price levels.  Tables A.1 and A.2 show the activity and the price levels in the
model and Table A.3 explains the set notation.
The algebraic exposition of the model begins with the profit functions.  We then
derive the market clearance conditions by exploiting Shephard’s lemma: differentiation of the
profit functions with respect to input and output prices yields compensated demand and
supply functions.  The exposition and our empirical implementation uses calibrated CES
functions as the key element.  Tables A.4-A.6 explain the notation for the calibrated model
parameters.
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2. Production of fossil fuels:
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3. Sector-specific energy aggregate:
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4. Armington aggregate except fossil fuels:
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5. Armington aggregate for fossil fuels
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10.Household energy demand:
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Market Clearance Conditions
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Appendix B
This appendix describes the calibration of our model to the CW baseline. In two steps,
we incorporate exogenous information on non-uniform growth rates in GDP, fossil fuel
production, fuel mixes in electricity generation, changes in world market energy prices and
CO2 emission profiles.
First, we fix the time profile of fossil fuel supplies from the EU to the exogenous
baseline projections by making supplies inelastic and scaling sector-specific resources with
the exogenous growth rates in fossil fuel production.  This allows us to partially control the
emission profile from the supply side (except the effects of imported fuels).  On the demand
side, we incorporate AEEI on the energy demands by consumers and production activities.
We also incorporate exogenous fuel shifting in the electricity sector and exogenous, region-
specific GDP growth rates determine the size of labor endowments.  Finally, we adjust import
demand and export supply functions with respect to the rest of the world to account for
exogenous changes in world market energy prices.  We solve the model with these changes in
parameter values and obtain country-specific estimates for CO2 emissions. 
These estimates deviate from the CO2 emissions profile in the CW baseline by
changes in the fossil fuel supplies from the rest of the world.  We therefore include a second
step in the calibration procedure where we scale the non-electric AEEI factors to reduce
energy demands and, hence, CO2 emissions.  The scaling takes place country by country to
match the model as close as possible to the CW emissions profiles.  We solve the model
again to verify that it represents the CW baseline as an equilibrium solution.  Finally, we use
the equilibrium prices to calibrate the fossil fuel production functions to a price elasticity of
supply equal to one.
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Table 1. EU member state commitments
Member States Commitments in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol
Belgium -7.5%
Denmark -21%
Germany -21%
Greece  +25%
Spain  +15% 
France 0%
Ireland  +13%
Italy -6.5%
Luxembourg -28%
Netherlands -6%
Austria -13%
Portugal  +27%
Finland 0%
Sweden  +4%
United Kingdom -12.5%
EU -8%
Source: Appendix 1 in EU [1998].
Table 2. Benchmark data for 1990
A. Summary statistics
DE DK ES IT FR UK REU EU
GDP (% of EU total) 24 2 6 15 19 16 18 100
CO2 (% of EU total) 32 2 7 13 12 18 17 100
CO2  (ton per capita) 13 11 5 7 7 10 8 9
Electricity (ton of CO2/GWh) 653 892 429 565 105 686 260 462
B. CO2 emissions sources (%)
DE DK ES IT FR UK REU EU
Electricity 36 43 31 30 12 38 23 30
Energy production 3 2 6 5 5 5 5 4
Industry 20 11 21 20 23 14 24 20
Transport 17 26 32 25 34 24 26 24
Final demand 24 17 10 20 26 19 22 21
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: The Rest of the European Union (REU) includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Greece,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden.  Table 5 explains the other region acronyms.  
Source: Calculations based on European Commission [1996; 161-209].
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Table 3. Conventional Wisdom baseline assumptions
A. Average GDP growth rate (% p.a.)
DE DK ES FR IT UK EU
1990-2000 2.8 2.6 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.1 
2000-2010 2.3 2.0 2.7 2.5 2.0 2.1 2.3 
 
B. Average CO2 growth rate (% p.a.)
DE DK ES FR IT UK EU
1990-2000 -0.2 1.9 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.3 
2000-2010 0.1 -0.8 1.4 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.5 
C. Implied average improvement in CO2 intensity (% p.a.)
DE DK ES FR IT UK EU
1990-2000 2.9 0.7 1.5 1.3 0.9 1.5 1.8 
2000-2010 2.1 2.7 1.3 2.4 1.5 1.9 1.8 
D. Average growth rates for fossil fuel inputs to electricity generation (% p.a.)
DE DK ES FR IT UK EU
1990-2000
Coal -0.8 1.6 -4.9 3.3 6.7 -4.2 -1.0 
Oil 8.0 9.3 3.3 -13.1 -0.9 -6.3 -0.1 
Gas 4.2 25.4 25.8 6.5 2.2 31.3 8.3 
2000-2010
Coal -0.5 -3.4 2.1 -11.9 -0.8 -6.0 -1.2 
Oil -1.5 -5.1 -1.2 -14.3 -5.4 3.4 -2.2 
Gas 6.0 7.3 7.9 10.9 8.5 6.1 6.6 
Note: Table 5 explains the region acronyms.  
Source: Calculations based on European Commission [1996; 161-209].
Table 4. Change in emissions in 2010
Relative to 1990 emissions Relative to BaU emissions in 2010
Kyoto CW LOW_AEEI KYOTO UNIFORM HIGH_BAU
EU -11% 6% 20% -16% -16% -26% 
DE -21% -1% 18% -21% -10% -33% 
DK -21% 12% 45% -30% -21% -45% 
UK -12.5% 5% 22% -17% -15% -28% 
FR 0% 7% 19% -6% -17% -16% 
IT -6.5% 15% 15% -18% -22% -18% 
ES 15% 22% 28% -6% -27% -10% 
Note: Table 5 explains the region acronyms.
Source: European Commission [1996; 161-209] and own calculations
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Table 5. Sectors and regions in the model
Production sectors (Eurostat’s R59 code in brackets):
1.Coal (031,033)
2.Crude oil (071)
3.Refined oil (073)
4.Natural and manufactured gases (075,098)
5.Electricity and steam (097,099)
6.Agriculture (010)
7.Iron and steel (135,136)
8.Chemical products (170)
9.Non-ferrous metals (137)
10.Non-metallic minerals (151,153,155,157)
11.Machinery (190,210,230,250)
12.Transport equipment (270,290)
13.Paper pulp and printing (471,473)
14.Wood and wood products (450)
15.Food processing beverages and tobacco (310,330,350,370,390)
16.Textiles and leather (410,430)
17.Transport (611,613,617,631,633,650)
18.Other industries (095,490,510,530,550,570,590,670,690,710,730,750,770,790,810,850,890,930)
Regions
1.DE Germany
2.DK Denmark
3.ES Spain
4.FR France
5.IT Italy
6.UK United Kingdom
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Table A.1 Activity variables
Production in sector i and region r Yir
Aggregate energy input in sector i and region r Eir
Aggregate imports in good i and region rMir
Armington aggregate for demand category d of good i in region r Adir
Aggregate investment in region rI
r
Aggregate public output in region rG
r
Aggregate household consumption in region rC
r
Aggregate household energy consumption in region rD
r
Table A.2 Price variables 
Output price of good i produced in region rpir
Price of aggregate energy in sector i and region rp Eir
Import price aggregate for good i imported to region rp Mir
Price of Armington aggregate for demand category d of good i in region rp Adir
Price of investment demand in region rp Ir
Price of government demand in region rp Gr
Price of aggregate household consumption in region rp Cr
Price of aggregate household energy consumption in region rp ECr
Wage rate in region rw
r
Price of capital services in region rv
r
Rent to natural resources in region r (iFF)qir
Real exchange rate with the rest of the worldp w
Carbon tax in region rt cr
Table A.3 Sets
i Sectors and goods
j Aliased with i
r EU regions
s Aliased with r
EG All energy goods: Coal, crude oil, refined oil, gas and electricity
FF Primary fossil fuels: Coal, crude oil, and gas
LQ Liquid fuels: Crude oil, refined oil and gas
d Demand categories: Y=intermediate, C=household, and I=investment.
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Table A.4 Cost shares
Share of exports from sector i in region r to region s (iÕFF)Xirs
Share of exports from sector i in region r to the rest of the world (iÕFF)Wir
Share of labor in value added in sector i and region r (iÕFF)Lir
Share of intermediate good j in sector i and region r (iFF)jir
Share of KLE aggregate in sector i and region r (iFF)KLEir
Share of energy in the KLE aggregate of sector i and region r (iFF)Eir
Share of natural resources in sector i and region r (iFF)Qir
Share of intermediate good j in sector i of region r (iFF) FFjir
Share of labor in sector i and region r (iFF) Lir
Share of capital in sector i and region r (iFF) Kir
Share of coal in energy demand by sector i in region r (iÕFF)COir
Share of electricity in non-coal energy demand by sector i in region r (iÕFF)ELir
Share of fossil fuel j in energy demand by sector j in region r  (iÕFF, jLQ)jir
Share of imports of good i from region s to region r (iÕFF)Misr
Share of domestic variety i in Armington aggregate for demand category d for good i in region rAdir
Share of good i in investment in region rIir
Share of good i in government demand in region rGir
Share of energy in aggregate household consumption in region r ECr
Share of non-energy good i in non-energy household consumption demand in region rir
Share of electricity in aggregate household energy consumption in region rELr
Share of non-electric energy-good i in the non-electric household energy consumption in region rEir
Marginal propensity to save in region rµ
r
Table A.5 Endowments and emissions coefficients
Carbon emissions coefficient for fossil fuel j in demand category d of region r (jFF)a cdjr
 Aggregate labor endowment in region rL
r
 Aggregate capital endowment in region rK
r
 Endowment of natural resource i in region r (iFF)Qir
 Aggregate government demand in region rG
r
Balance of payment surplus in region rB
r
Endowment of carbon emission rights in region rZ
r
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Table A.6 Elasticities
Transformation between production for the domestic and export markets 4
Substitution between energy and value-added in non-fossil fuel production 0.3)KLE
Substitution between natural resources and other inputs in fossil fuel production)Q
Supply in fossil fuel production 1'
Substitution between coal and the non-coal energy in non-fossil fuel production 0.5)CO
Substitution between electricity and the non-coal fossil fuels in non-fossil fuel production 0.3)EL
Substitution between imports from different regions 8)M
Substitution between the import aggregate and the domestic good 4)A
Substitution between energy and non-energy in household consumption 0.3)EC
Substitution between electricity and the non-electric energy in household energy consumption 0.3)EL
Substitution between non-electric energy in household energy consumption 0.5)NE
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Figure 1. Emissions profiles
Figure 2. Carbon tax rates in the KYOTO scenario
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Figure 3. Consumption losses in 2010
Figure 4. Carbon tax rates in the UNIFORM scenario
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Figure 5. Carbon tax rates in the HIGH_BAU scenario
